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The Faculty, the Web, and the People: 
Academic Freedom in the New Public Sphere 
For a century, now, we in academia have been slowly retreating from the 
idealistic commitment to intellectual engagement within a republican tradition.  
Today, the idea of intellectual responsibility through our universities to society as 
a whole is seen by many as anachronistic, a naïve vision from a time long past.  
Through a process of professionalization of intellectual activity, we have seen 
intellectual pursuits removed from the public sphere.  This, I think, is a problem, 
and one that we have not really considered from within our universities.  We in 
the universities have let the third function of academic freedom presented by 
Edwin Seligman and Arthur Lovejoy in the 1915 American Association of 
University Professors’ “Declaration of Principles,” “To develop experts for various 
branches of the public service,” drift away from us. 
The new graduate programs that began appearing in America during the 
last quarter of the 19th Century saw their task as one of training students to work 
within the systems of American society for reform, such as it was.  By the time a 
century had passed, visions of academic purpose, of course, had somewhat 
changed.  Graduate programs, by 1975, were increasingly positioning 
themselves in opposition to the status quo rather than simply as institutions 
producing people to bolster it or improve it.  This has led to the sense of 
separation we are witnessing today between the academy and much of the 
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American population, the most hostile to academia being that small section on 
the political right led by the likes of David Horowitz, with his recent “Academic Bill 
of Rights” crusade, and Anne Neal, head of a relatively new organization called 
the American Council of Trustees and Alumni.  They feel that our universities 
have become the agency for indoctrination of our young people into a world view 
that would radically change American culture. 
The advent of the Internet has, so far, only exacerbated this division 
between most Americans and the faculties of their universities.  However, it also 
presents avenues for creating bridges between the faculties and the general 
population, though they have yet to be adequately explored.  It is these that I 
want to speak toward today, for they might even bring us back—not to the rather 
naïve attitudes of the early days of universities, but at least to a point where 
faculties are seen popularly not as opponents of the greater society but as the 
positive contributors that, in fact, they have always been and as yet, in fact, 
remain.  They might even bring us back to a time where academic freedom is 
once again understood as a valid and valuable right on its own, and not simply as 
the campus adjunct to the First Amendment. 
Let me start, though, with a little background: 
Conducting first-rate research and providing excellent teaching, along with 
the resulting creation of new researchers and teachers, were but two of the three 
goals of the university as it developed in the decades before that first clear 
enunciation of the principle of academic freedom in 1915.  As important as these 
was that third goal, the creation of intellectual participants in government, people 
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who could guide the great debates of the nation, from among both the students 
and the faculty. 
By the end of the 19th Century, the classical curriculum of American 
colleges and universities had been superseded by a diverse curriculum 
supervised by new specialists in the humanities, the natural sciences, and the 
newer social sciences.  Not surprisingly, this brought with it new attitudes 
towards the goals of research, teaching, and academia’s place in society—along 
with a developing model for American universities that was to be, finally, little 
different from what we know today. 
One of the first changes resulting from the new system was what was at 
first a de facto system of scholarly certification.  The “independent scholar” 
became harder and harder to find, faculty affiliation with an institution of higher 
education becoming an almost necessary step towards having one’s work taken 
seriously.  The community of scholars able to understand any particular piece of 
advanced work grew smaller with specialization, and the faculties developed their 
own shortcuts for evaluation of new scholarship.  Did the presenter have an 
academic affiliation?  With whom had he studied?  Had he published in the past 
in reputable venues?  The answers to these questions saved time by creating an 
informal gate-keeping process.  However, this, and the peer-review process that 
followed, soon began to set the faculties off from the general population and 
even from those who administered the schools.  Membership in the club now 
came with very real privileges in terms of involvement in scholarly debate and 
even in ability to conduct new research.  Seeing themselves as a “special” group 
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also led the faculties to believe that governance of their research and teaching 
had to rest with them only as well: for obvious reasons, they felt that no “outsider” 
was qualified to judge them.  We are living with the results of this in our 
universities today—it can even be seen in the mundane ways our departments 
are run.   
Not all the attitudes of that time have survived intact, however.  In the eyes 
of the founders of the AAUP, those who first codified “academic freedom,” self-
governance implied taking on responsibilities in the wider community which, in 
turn, called for an expansion of the special academic rights so that they covered 
outside as well as on-campus work.  Today, for the most part, only a token nod is 
made towards community involvement in many of our universities, the focus (for 
promotion, at least) generally now being on teaching, service to the department 
and the institution, and scholarship.  I’d like to see that change; the Internet, 
oddly enough, may force it to. 
Though, by today’s standards, the attitudes expressed by Seligman and 
Lovejoy in the 1915 Declaration may, as I have said, seem somewhat naïve, their 
view of the place of the university within the greater society and within the 
context of academic freedom remains significant.  They wrote, for example, that 
one function: 
of the modern university is to develop experts for the use of the 
community.  If there is one thing that distinguishes the more recent 
developments of democracy, it is the recognition by legislators of 
the inherent complexities of economic, social and political life, and 
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the difficulty of solving problems of technical adjustment without 
technical knowledge. The recognition of this fact has led to a 
continually greater demand for the aid of experts in these subjects, 
to advise both legislators and administrators. The training of such 
experts has, accordingly, in recent years, become an important part 
of work of the universities; and in almost every one of our higher 
institutions of learning the professors of the economic, social, and 
political sciences have been drafted to an increasing extent into 
more or less unofficial participation in the public service. It is 
obvious that here again the scholar must be absolutely free not only 
to pursue his investigations but to declare the results of his 
researches, no matter where they may lead him or to what extent 
they may come into conflict with accepted opinion.  To be of use to 
the legislator or the administrator, he must enjoy their complete 
confidence in the disinterestedness of his conclusions. (Seligman) 
Though the need to be able to express an unpopular opinion in safety is as clear 
to today as it was in 1915, that idea that a scholar can really be “disinterested” is, 
we have learned, absurd.  Not even the journalists who claim “objectivity” are 
taken at face value today, when even the least educated amongst us 
understands the impact of relative viewpoints on observation of any event.  Still, 
the universities have continued to play a part in the public sphere, though 
perhaps not quite in the role of wise men that Lovejoy and Seligman may have 
imagined.   
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Yet the momentum, even in 1915, was away from active involvement in 
the public sphere.  The desire to construct a self-governing research community 
provided an inward momentum that no amount of public spiritedness was able to 
stem.  Professors, more and more, looked only to each other for approval, a fact 
whose downside has become quite clear these past five years, as resentment of 
the universities has grown in the wake of 9/11. 
Even as much of intellectual debate was retreating into the universities, 
some of those within were taking the AAUP’s commitment to a role in the greater 
society quite seriously and were trying to fill it.  One of these, of course, was the 
AAUP’s founding president, John Dewey.  At the core of Dewey’s educational 
philosophy was the idea that citizens could think—that the common person has 
the intelligence and wherewithal to participate in even the most complex of public 
debates—with the right training and with access to information.  The spread of 
community colleges and the continuing increase in the number of college 
graduates, of course, can be traced, in part, to his influence.   
Countering Dewey in the public sphere was one of the great intellects 
outside of academia of the time, Walter Lippmann.  Lippmann, in Public Opinion 
and, three years later (in 1925) in The Phantom Public, made a case that has 
been reiterated more recently by the followers of the late Leo Strauss of the 
University of Chicago, that the public is not capable of digesting complex issues 
for itself.  Things need to be simplified, presented in either/or form to the general 
public by a trained elite that can boil down the issues to easily digestible status.  
Dewey defended his more optimistic view of public intelligence two years later in 
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The Public and Its Problems.  The debate was the type Dewey wanted to see 
taking place in public and not simply behind university walls.  It is also a type of 
debate whose re-emergence on the public stage could be assisted through 
utilization of new technologies.  But more on that later. 
Both Lippmann and Dewey saw roles for intellectuals outside of the 
university but, strangely enough, in more recent times it has been the spiritual 
descendents of Lippmann and Strauss, now known as the Neocons, who have 
actually stepped outside of the academy to participate directly in American 
national decision-making in a very Dewey-like manner (though with 
Lippmannesque goals).  For all of Dewey’s belief in the common people, his heirs 
have retreated from them, for the most part, and into their faculty departments, 
arguing stridently with each other only for the causes they believe in and even 
applying their solutions on campus, but stepping outside of academia less and 
less often. 
Over the past four decades, part of the reason for this retreat may have 
been that the dominant political force in the United States has been a 
conservative one, more compatible with Lippmann than with Dewey, whose 
followers have tended towards more liberal political beliefs.  There really hasn’t 
been a truly liberal administration in Washington since the early days of Lyndon 
Johnson’s presidency.  Even high-profile Dewey-influenced scholars such as the 
philosopher Richard Rorty have had little impact on the course of government or 
debate—certainly not to the degree that Strauss has had. 
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At times it even seems as though liberal intellectuals have retreated on 
purpose, ceding the public sphere to the strident, the true believer, and the 
demagogue—and to those intellectuals operating outside of academia who, one 
might say, saw their chance and took it. 
Over the past thirty years, conservative intellectuals who found 
themselves uncomfortable in university settings have created numerous think 
tanks with the help of deep-pocketed supporters, institutions dedicated to just the 
sort of activities in the wider political culture Lovejoy and Seligman had 
envisioned for the universities.  Though unlike universities in many respects, the 
think tanks certainly have stepped into the vacuum that the universities (or many 
of them—there have always been strong programs devoted to issues of the 
public sphere, just not enough of them) created by their inattention to public 
affairs.  If anything, their influence continues to expand.  Beshara Doumani, a 
professor of History at the University of California at Berkeley, writing about 
academic freedom in the post-9/11 American world, remarks that: 
The role of private groups in exerting external pressures on 
the academy may have been energized by the events of 9/11, but it 
is rooted in a four-decade-long, massive investment by right-wing 
groups in a national network of institutions: think tanks, policy 
institutes, grassroots faith-based organizations, law firms, social 
advocacy groups, corporate lobbying outfits, media outlets (radio, 
television, newspapers, the Internet), tracking organizations, and 
pressure groups of various kinds.  (25) 
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A means for effective interaction between the universities and the greater society 
had been usurped.  Furthermore, while these groups have been studying the 
relationships between the various constituencies in American society in face of 
changing technologies—especially their own relationships to these—academia 
has ignored the way technologies are changing its own relationships with the 
outside world, perhaps losing yet another march. 
Aside from their obvious lack of teaching tasks, there is another aspect of 
the mission of the think tanks that is different from that of the universities.  That 
is, they are driven by a purpose quite distinct from the three enunciated in the 
1915 Declaration.  In fact, they are akin to a specific type of institution, one 
deliberately placed aside from questions of academic freedom in that 
Declaration.  Seligman and Lovejoy wrote that this is: 
the proprietary school or college designed for the propagation of 
specific doctrines prescribed by those who have furnished its 
endowment. It is evident that in such cases the trustees are bound 
by the deed of gift, and, whatever be their own views, are obligated 
to carry out the terms of the trust. If a church or religious 
denomination established a college to be governed by a board of 
trustees, with the express understanding that the college will be 
used as an instrument of propaganda in the interests of the 
religious faith professed by the church or denomination creating it, 
the trustees have a right to demand that everything be 
subordinated to that end. If, again, as has happened in this country, 
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a wealthy manufacturer establishes a special school in a university 
in order to teach, among other things, the advantages of a 
protective tariff, or if, as is also the case, an institution has been 
endowed for the purpose of propagating the doctrines of socialism, 
the situation is analogous. All of these are essentially proprietary 
institutions, in the moral sense. They do not, at least as regards on 
particular subject, accept the principles of freedom of inquiry, of 
opinion, and of teaching; and their purpose is not to advance 
knowledge by the unrestricted research and unfettered discussion 
of impartial investigators, but rather to subsidize the promotion of 
the opinions held by the persons, usually not of the scholar's 
calling, who provide the funds for their maintenance.  (Seligman) 
Such institutions can be extremely successful, as the think tanks have been, but 
they do not promote the type of discourse without pre-determined goals that the 
AAUP envisioned for the universities—and for the good of the country.  For, yes, 
there is a political underpinning to the AAUP stand.  It is most certainly a liberal 
one, reflecting the liberal nature of the ideas or debate and exploration behind 
American academic institutions. 
One of the reasons for the creation of the think tanks is that many on the 
right view the universities not as necessary or inherently liberal but as caught up 
in a liberal hegemony.  In a sense, they are right, but not in the way some of 
them believe.  Others, particularly those who have established the think tanks, do 
understand why American universities are structurally liberal—just as the think 
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tanks, built both to counter university influence and to step in where they have 
failed, are inherently conservative, built to provide grounding for conclusions 
already reached, a position that is supposed to be anathema within the 
universities.  Look at the difference like this: there is no room for a liberal in a 
conservative think tank by the very definition of the institution.  Whereas, also by 
definition, there is plenty of room for conservative scholars in that liberal 
institution, the university.  The reality, of course, may be different.  Many on the 
right believe that it is different. 
Yes, one of the complaints that people on the right voice over and over 
again about our contemporary universities is that their faculties tend to be 
overwhelmingly liberal.  They see a conspiracy to keep conservatives out.  
What’s frustrating about this is not that it’s true that faculties are predominately 
liberal, but that it’s the nature of the beast and not the result of conspiracy.   
There’s a basic misunderstanding involved here, as basic as that leading 
many people to see academic freedom as a part of freedom of expression.  
“Liberal,” as in “liberal democracy,” the “liberal media,” and “liberal arts,” is not a 
political stand except in that it stands in opposition to foundationalist approaches 
to thinking, research, and debate.  Liberalism rejects a priori truth, insisting 
instead on demonstrable truth.  The “liberal media,” for example, don’t start from 
a left-wing political bias but, ideally, from a desire to get at the truth—as opposed 
to entities such as Fox News where there is an explicit political purpose behind 
all of its actions.  The “liberal media,” when they are doing their job (like our 
universities, our news media don’t always live up to their ideals), don’t adhere to 
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any political line, conservative or progressive and annoy both sides equally.  In 
this sense, liberalism really doesn’t belong on a political spectrum but should 
stand on a philosophical one.  It would make more sense to posit opposition 
between conservatives and progressives than between conservatives and 
liberals—for liberalism can embrace conservatives as easily as it does 
progressives.  Not all conservatives, certainly, believe that truth is clear and 
appointed; many of them are seekers of truth, and it is the seekers that the liberal 
university wants to bring into its fold.   
Given the extraordinary influence of Dewey and other liberal thinkers over 
the development of American universities, it should be no wonder that they are 
not only liberal in structure—even the concept of “academic freedom,” Horowitz 
notwithstanding, is an essentially liberal one—but that they are staffed primarily 
by people of liberal persuasion.  This fact should be no more startling than the 
discovery that, in business, managers and executives fall just as heavily on the 
conservative side.  Business likes to operate from a known field (especially in 
terms of government) even when innovating—keeping the variables down and 
under control, an inherently conservative stance.  As the founding owner of a 
small business, I know exactly what that means and have felt the conservative 
desire to slow any change I am not in control of.   
In each case, university and business, it’s the underlying structure that 
causes people of certain inclinations to choose one over the other—not, as some 
believe, evil machinations by the gate-keepers.  That this fundamental fact of 
academia is being used to attack it is a sign that universities have failed in their 
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extramural role in society and that the aim of the attacks isn’t really reform at all, 
but destruction of our universities as we have known them for over a century.  
With that, of course, would go academic freedom. 
The impact would be the same on our businesses if we started insisting 
that socialists be included in their sales and managerial hierarchies.  Sure, 
socialists can succeed in business, just as totalitarians, say, can in academia.  
But academia does not work on a philosophy that attracts totalitarians any more 
than business operates in a fashion that draws most socialists.  If their 
participation were mandated, furthermore, root change would be inevitable.  The 
regulated free market of ideas would disappear as quickly as would our regulated 
free market of goods. 
This is not to say that either our contemporary systems of business or our 
modern universities are perfect—only that mandating reform based on the 
personal political biases of participants is dangerous.  Certainly, in both cases, 
things can get out of hand—at least in public perception—making certain people 
wish they could exercise more control.  With salaries at levels sometimes 
hundreds of times what their workers make, corporate executives are perceived 
as venal and uncaring—something that is not really the case in most instances.  
Even if they were all ogres, legislating a different type of person into the picture 
would be no solution.   
From viewpoints outside the protections of our universities, professors are 
sometimes seen as having attempted what amounts to experiments in social 
engineering, of molding students into radical paths—also something that is not 
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really the case.  Certainly, people in universities have been leaders in such 
things as affirmative action, in what some deride as “political correctness,” and in 
attempts at lowering societal tolerance for hate speech of all sorts.  But, though 
gathering all sorts of publicity, these things have had correspondingly small 
influence on college students or on the society as a whole.  About all these 
activities have accomplished, really, is a widening of the gap between academia 
and the rest of American society.  Forcing universities to hire more conservatives 
is not in itself going to change that.  Such change, if it comes, will result from 
other forces. 
One of the ironies of the rise of the modern university and its concurrent 
specializations was that movement I mentioned, of intellectual activity of all sorts 
heading into the university and, to all intents and purposes, out of the public 
sphere.  The idea, the intent, was the opposite.  Political realities and other 
factors (not the least being the heavy demands of teaching an ever-expanding 
student population), however, have led to the divisive situation we are living with 
today.  The only active attempt at a corrective has been the think tanks—and 
they, as I have said, are too purpose driven to fully replace the university even 
just in the public sphere.  Yet change continues, and new possibilities arise.  
Today, in part because of the Internet, we have a chance to bring intellectual 
debate back out where it belongs, perhaps sparking a greater change in 
academia than any since the modern university system appeared. 
Thanks to the Internet, the ivory tower no longer protects academia from 
the general population nearly as much as it once did.  No longer can scholars, 
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frustrated by their reception in the broader world, retreat to the safety of the 
university.  Much of what we do is now so much more open to scrutiny… our 
syllabi (which are appearing online with more and more frequency), our 
assignments, our course notes… all of these are increasingly easily found and 
debated in arenas well beyond the university’s traditional purview.  Though much 
of what we do is protected by proprietary systems such as Blackboard, even 
these systems aren’t really meant to keep people out, their main focus (in this 
regard) really being protection of the privacy of students. 
In most respects, we inside academia do not like the idea of proprietary 
knowledge.  We want to share what we have learned—for many of us, this is why 
we teach.  We do not want to protect knowledge, but spread it.  Thus, we have 
loved the idea of putting course information up on the Internet.  Why not?  We’re 
proud of what we are doing and believe we can attract more people to it by 
making it all transparent. 
The thing is, we’ve been rather naïve in the way we’ve been approaching 
the Internet.  We’ve forgotten that there are people out there trolling to find 
ammunition to use against the universities—and that much of what we post, 
improperly excerpted or placed outside of its original context, can seem to be 
damning words from our very own mouths.  Secure in the virtue of what we are 
doing, we ignore the fact that others might not see it the same way. 
Sure, we’ve had to convince our departments when putting together new 
courses, but we rarely place the underlying rationale before our students, 
generally letting go of the discussion and consideration of rationale once the 
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course is in place.  Our students, after all, will experience the class directly and 
can judge through the doing, asking questions over the semester.  Outsiders, 
however, who may come across an online syllabus or assignment, may have no 
idea of the context or reasons for the specifics of either. 
And this can get us into trouble. 
Now, I would never suggest that we become protective of our syllabi, 
reading lists, or anything else.  No, I think our solution lies in the opposite 
direction, in providing more information, but doing it with care and connectivity 
rather than just dumping information online, rather than just using the Internet as 
a convenient storehouse for handouts our students might have missed.  Each 
time we post something to the Internet, we should consider that many more than 
just our students might be viewing it—and we should make the document 
accessible in the full sense of its meaning, even to those who will never enter our 
classrooms.  In other words, rather than simply placing our documents online and 
providing the context in our classrooms, we need to be presenting the context, 
the rationale for each document, online with it.  No longer are we simply involved 
with teaching when we decide to utilize the Internet.  We are also deciding to 
bring our classrooms into the public sphere in ways we never have before—and 
this has an impact on academic freedom. 
Recently, Horowitz has been producing a series of examinations of 
university programs through the documents he has found on their websites—and 
through these only.  Taking them out of context, he has been able to build cases 
against specific courses, professors, and programs, making them seem bent on 
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indoctrination, not education.  He could still do this even if context and rationale 
had been provided, but his arguments would be less persuasive if his readers 
could easily find the original reasoning through the links that even Horowitz finds 
it necessary to provide.  The threat to academic freedom that Horowitz 
represents would be lessened. 
When I was being interviewed by a dean for a job several years ago, he 
prefaced one of his questions by saying, “Of course, I can’t come into your 
classroom without invitation.”  That surprised me—I had been outside of 
academia for some time as was no longer quite so familiar with its ways.  I 
assumed my classroom door was open to anyone at any time, just as my store 
and café always were—and this is how I think it should be.  But mine is a minority 
opinion: many teachers are quite protective of their prerogatives under academic 
freedom and, therefore, want to control access to their classrooms, fearing that 
administrators, in particular, might use that access to encroach on the instructor’s 
freedoms within the classroom.  In many cases, the right to refuse or control 
entrance is an entrenched part of union contracts.  As I believe that the best 
defense of academic freedom is to make everything open and public, I’m not a 
big supporter of such rules, though I understand them and sympathize with the 
reasoning behind them.  Many of us forget this reasoning, however, when we 
post to the Internet.  But the same concerns apply. 
Before the age of the Internet and its growing utilization within the 
classroom and in relation to research, the real questions of academic freedom 
remained, for the most part, outside of general public awareness.  Extramural 
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expression covered by academic-freedom precepts mainly concerned explicitly 
political statements and activities of faculty that stemmed from research.  Today, 
research and classroom activities themselves can be just as public as those 
activities once specifically meant for the public sphere.  This changes the way 
that faculty members approach extramural expression and changes the very 
conception of academic freedom, even by its older definition.  If we want to 
protect our freedom of research and in the classroom, in other words, we have a 
responsibility to protect it in the public arena as well.  And that means we must 
always consider the impact of what we post might have on people far removed 
from our classrooms.  With academic freedom comes responsibility.  If we don’t 
take that responsibility seriously, we will lose the freedom. 
If we take this up, we will also be taking a positive first step towards 
emerging once again from our campuses and into the public sphere.  And, 
through showing what we are doing in the fullness of its design, we will be 
starting to seriously counter the image of the college professor as an out-of-touch 
liberal—for it is also true that, though college professors vote overwhelmingly for 
Democrats, not nearly so many could really be classified as political leftists.  
Once people can see us in the complete context of our professional activities, 
they may well come to understand this. 
In thinking about how to take the universities public (if you will), in 
considering how to react to the impact of the Internet, it is worth remembering 
that the academic freedom that should both protect us and propel us even in this 
task is not really the same as a First Amendment right.  The fact of connection 
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with a university does not necessarily make any particular incident a case 
relating to academic freedom.  In other words, we cannot hide behind “academic 
freedom” as we venture out into the world.  In many ways, academic freedom is 
nothing more than a compact between faculties and the institutions that house 
them.  It is not guaranteed in law, certainly not by the First Amendment—even 
though there have been attempts to forge such a link in court arguments and 
opinions all the way up to the Supreme Court. 
Though that connection between academic freedom and the First 
Amendment has been established over the past decades, it is an unfortunate 
one, a blurring of issues that really should be kept distinct.  Even people who 
should know better, such as Doumani, sometimes conflate the two, as he does 
when he argues that one of the biggest threats to academic freedom as we 
venture into the public sphere today is the “War on Terror”: 
Why?  Partly, this is because of the virulently anti-intellectual nature 
of both the 9/11 attacks and the war launched in response.  Mostly, 
however, it is because 9/11 crystallized three long-term processes.  
First, the emergence of the United States after the end of the Cold 
War as the uncontested global economic and military power.  
Second, the political triumph of a highly ideological coalition of 
evangelical religious fundamentalists, militant nationalists, and 
neoconservatives that now dominates, among others, the 
presidency, the Congress [this having been written before last 
November’s elections], and the top civilian ranks of the Pentagon 
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and is imposing itself on the intelligence services.  Third, the 
privatization and commercialization of knowledge in an information 
age, which has greatly reduced the degree of intellectually 
autonomy with universities and magnified the influence of private 
donors and corporations.  (15-16) 
The threat that Doumani outlines, however, though it does impinge on 
universities, isn’t to academic freedom per se, but to freedom of expression as a 
whole.  Yet Doumani does point out something that we do need to consider in 
looking at academic freedom in the Internet age, and that is “the privatization and 
commercialization of knowledge.”  Here I agree with Doumani completely: this is 
a direct threat to academic freedom.  In fact, the one thing that may stop us from 
returning to the public sphere in force is the proprietary aspect of much of 
contemporary knowledge. 
Right now, as you all know, we are fighting a battle against plagiarism 
within our own classrooms and are also trying to deal with abuse of copyright in 
our own preparation and even in our research.  Few of us worry about this much 
when we are photocopying an article and distributing it to our classes, but it 
becomes critical, at times, to our research.  So, while we struggle with our 
students’ tendency to copy wholesale from the web without attribution, we are 
also trying to come to terms with “fair use” clauses for ourselves, many of us 
even begin to wonder if there will ever be a rational system for utilization of the 
work of others or if everything will require elaborate permissions and, one day, 
even the utilization of extensive proprietary software to get at it.  We’ve begun to 
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question whether our freedom to work unfettered has already been compromised 
by the proprietary needs of others.  As Doumani, again, writes, “Simply put, as 
the commercialization of knowledge expands, the space accorded to academic 
freedom contracts” (34). 
Because academic freedom is not really a legal doctrine, it has no weight 
in arguments about usage of proprietary knowledge, and this is unfortunate.  The 
commercialization of knowledge is impinging on academic freedom not just in the 
way we can talk and write about what we have researched, but even in what we 
can research.  Until academic freedom becomes somehow codified in law, 
however, we won’t be able to do much more than keep this problem before the 
public and our colleagues by showing through our own research results that, in 
most cases, it’s an example of being penny wise and pound foolish. 
However, it does have an impact on our role in the public sphere—and it 
really is the other side of the plagiarism coin.  Both problems existed before the 
Internet, but not nearly to the degree that they do now.  I don’t have a solution for 
this problem of restriction of knowledge and of attribution other than continuing to 
support Lawrence Lessig and the Creative Commons copyright alternative—and 
to continue to seek improved means for attribution in student work. 
What are some of the things we can do to bring our activities more fully 
before the public in order to both protect academic freedom and to fulfill its 
mission?  There are quite a number, and more will arise as people experiment.  
One that intrigues me particularly is the idea of moving peer review from its 
position as a prior restraint on publication to an evaluative role after the fact.  
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Taking advantage of the ease and relative inexpense of publishing on the web—
and of allowing people to comment, a system could be developed for a new sort 
of journal where the referees provide commentary and recommendation publicly 
and the articles are rated on a scale weighted by the bona fides of each rater and 
by later citations in significant venues.  The work would have to stand on its own 
from the beginning. 
Or, rather, the author would have to be willing to undergo the revision 
process in public.  Unlike an article in a print journal, Internet publications can be 
constantly revised.  Scholars could take from the comments what they see as 
valuable suggestions for change and improvement, constantly tinkering and 
revising their work and even furthering the discussion. 
Such a system would invite the public to observe exactly how academic 
writing and evaluation take place—even to the extent of allowing a certain 
amount of involvement by interested outsiders.  With this, people could come to a 
greater understanding of just why those of us within academia find the concept of 
academic freedom so important, for they would be seeing it in operation. 
Another way that academics can bring their work before the public in a 
positive way is through the blogs.  Though there are many who advise young 
academics not to get too involved in blogging (thinking that hiring committees will 
search through Google and find damning posts), their attitude is simply an 
extension of that leading to closed classroom doors.  Personally, I find blogging a 
wonderful avenue for widening academic discussion.  For me, it has led to new 
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connections with other academics, new avenues of research and exploration, 
and, quite frankly, to a better understanding of my profession. 
Perhaps the premier academic blogger today is Michael Bérubé of 
Pennsylvania State University, whose website has been visited some five million 
times since it was established in early 2004, just three years ago.  Introducing a 
selection of his blog posts in a recent book, he writes about what the blogs can 
be, asserting that, through his, he wants to “Demonstrate the potential discursive 
and tonal range of academic blog writing while posing the question of whether 
blog writing can be understood in the terms bequeathed to us by the print culture 
of the book” (289).  In other words, his blog is an academic exercise, one that 
deserves the respect afforded any other academic exercise and, therefore, 
should be afforded the same academic-freedom protections assumed by any lab 
scientist.  Though few blogs are as successful or as interesting as Bérubé’s, 
most academic blogs are objects of pride to their creators, not shame.  And most 
present posts much more intriguing than the stereotypical ruminations over 
choice of breakfast foods. 
Like most academic bloggers, Bérubé was quick to discover possibilities 
inherent in the blogs: 
one of the joys and challenges of blog writing—and one of the 
things that distinguishes it from every other kind of writing—is the 
plasticity of the hyperlink….  The other distinctive feature of blog 
writing, of course, is the comments section.  Not every blog allows 
comments, and some blogs’ comment sections consist of strings of 
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single-sentence insults and the equivalents of online screams and 
shouts.  But the best, most thought-provoking blogs are renowned 
not only for the quality of their writing but for the quality of writing 
they stimulate in response.  (289) 
What the blogs offer, among other things, is the possibility of dialogue extending 
far beyond particular campuses, far beyond even academia.  They become a 
new way of encouraging academic debate but also a way of making clear to the 
general population just what we, inside university walls, actually do. 
The idea that some within academia advise against blogging because of 
possible negative career implications bothers me, for it indicates that those 
holding such beliefs do not really understand the true nature of the blogs or the 
extent of academic freedom as it was originally envisioned.  Bloggers are 
experimenting with a new way of communicating and of developing knowledge.  
Their work, though public and not part of the traditional peer-review research 
formula, is research nonetheless, and deserves respect instead of the derision 
that sometimes accompanies admission that, “Yes, I’m a blogger.”  Much of 
academic blogging falls directly under that third point of academic freedom as 
expressed by Seligman and Lovejoy, that scholars need protection within the 
public sphere. 
In fact, this is perhaps the clearest example of the difference between 
academic-freedom protections and First Amendment rights.  No one questions a 
bloggers right to post, merely the wisdom of doing it.  That is exactly the same as 
advising against an avenue of laboratory research because it might offend 
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someone whose beliefs lie in a different direction.  And exactly why academic 
freedom is so important. 
As we move further into the public sphere with our academic work—as the 
Internet forces us to become more public—we will have to keep academic-
freedom concerns constantly before us or, as I have said before, we will lose it. 
One of the beauties of our university structure is that, though it has a 
political rationale underlying it, room is provided for a variety of expressions and 
beliefs.  People like Horowitz don’t believe this, but I think that’s simply because 
they don’t see the whole of what we are doing.  Horowitz thinks that a bunch of 
syllabi pulled off the net along with an anecdote or two is sufficient information for 
judging a campus program.  What we have to do, to protect our academic 
freedom and to fulfill its promise, is to bring both our research and our teaching 
into the full light of day, where not even Horowitz can misrepresent it.  The 
Internet is providing us a chance for doing this easily.  We would be fools not to 
take it. 
Thank you. 
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